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A Market for Environmentally Responsible Investment? Identifying 
Obstacles and Enablers of Commodification of Environmental Risks in the 
South African Investment Industry 
Stéphanie Giamporcaro 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the views of South African investment organizations on the likelihood of 
commodification of environmental risks in their investment decision processes. It is based on an empirical 
qualitative survey of 22 investment organizations, which are signatories to the United Nations’ Principles for 
Responsible Investment. We describe a range of issues, identified by the investment players interviewed, that are 
likely to prevent or accelerate the internalization of environmental risks in the South African investment 
industry. The chance that broader commodification of the South African investment industry will occur—
beyond the growing but still small ranks of responsible investors—seems to be linked to realization of an 
adequate political framing. This means legislating standardized environmental disclosure by corporations and a 
long-term commitment by institutional investors to responsible investment philosophies. The tension between 
social developmental goals and environmental goals is seen as a major political obstacle at the national level. 
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A Market for Environmentally Responsible Investment? Identifying 
Obstacles and Enablers of Commodification of Environmental Risks in 
the South African Investment Industry 
Stéphanie Giamporcaro 
Introduction 
As a commodification of risk, some authors embrace financial derivatives1 because they 
allow the world to effortlessly become a global trading room, where it is possible to turn a 
meteorological phenomenon, such as an extreme weather event, into a tradable commodity 
(Bryan and Rafferty 2006) via the financial markets. Empirical qualitative studies in the 
sociology of finance (Cabantous and Gond 2009; Callon 2009; Rainelli-Le Montagner and 
Huault 2010, forthcoming; MacKenzie 2009), however, have noticed that including events not 
normally considered relevant to the market—such as extreme weather, terrorist attacks, or 
climate change—actually requires a massive effort in calculative and political framing by market 
promoters, as well as political and scientific groups.  
Just as market players include weather or terrorist risks in the derivatives market, so do 
responsible investors want further commodification of environmental, social, and governance 
concerns (ESG) included in investment decisions. Originally, the responsible investor 
movement2 was built on avoiding “sin” stocks and was driven by the need to express personal 
                                                 
 Research Associate, Environment for Development; stephanie.giamporcaro@uct.ac.za. 
1 The growing importance of financial capitalism is seen in the launch and growth of sophisticated financial 
innovations, such as derivatives. In 2007, for example, there was US$ 677 trillion in over-the-counter transactions 
and trades in derivatives; in 1994, the amount was $94 trillion, and $2 trillion in 1998 (Rainelli-Le Montagner and 
Huault 2010, forthcoming). 
2 Several terms are used to define this movement and practices:  sustainable “ethical” or “socially responsible”   
investment (SRI) appeared in the 1990s. In this paper, SRI is defined by specific investment strategies and (usually) 
specific investment products (Giamporcaro 2006). This practice is often linked to investing to achieve a certain 
social outcome. Thus, SRI strategies and products can be said to be country specific, often geared toward affecting 
economic or social outcomes through the investment process.  
Responsible investment (RI) is defined here as the broad integration of ESG issues into investment decisionmaking 
in order to optimize financial performance. Driving it is the recognition by the large pension funds that are 
signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment that ESG issues have an impact on the long-term value of an 
investment and therefore must be considered. By including ESG issues in their investment criteria, pension funds are 
supposedly acting more “responsibly” toward their trustees—hence, responsible investment (Noah FI, UNEP-FI, 
and UNISA CCC). The industry thus consists of investors who invest in designated SRI funds, invest generally 
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(often religious or political) values via financial transactions. Such investors often perceived 
their transactions as a trade-off between civic principles and financial profits. Today, responsible 
investors seek to integrate “longer-term social and environmental factors” in a wide range of 
investment practices because of their conviction that it will, in the long run, have a positive 
impact on the financial performance of their portfolios (UNEP-FI 2006).  
Integrating ESG issues into financial decisions requires constructing a framework 
whereby social and environmental value or risk can be calculated. This began with the advent of 
environmental, social, and corporate governance rating agencies, which designed efficient 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) rating systems. These CSR systems were purchased in the 
1980s by socially responsible investors in North America and Europe to assess companies’ 
policies and practices in all economic sectors and to demonstrate a positive link between 
corporate social responsibility and financial performance (Gond and Palazzo 2009; Gond 2003; 
Shamir 2005).  
At the same time, an effort to institute a basic political framework for both CSR and RI 
movements occurred at national and international levels (Giamporcaro 2006). More recently, 
emerging countries, such as South Africa, Brazil, China, and South Korea, have also begun to 
embrace ESG risks commodification (Birgden, Guyatt, and Xinting 2009). Even though it is still 
seen as a marginal phenomenon in financial markets3 (Guyatt 2006; Haigh 2004), a small but 
growing number of institutional investors believe that their fiduciary duty is to achieve financial 
performance and returns for clients and take long-term environmental, social, and governance 
risks and opportunities into account (Freshfield Brukhaus Deringer 2005; UNEP-FI 2009). 
In their empirical work on weather derivatives, Rainelli-Le Montagner and Huault (2010, 
forthcoming) argued that creating a weather-derivative market to deal with drought problems in 
Africa can create uncomfortable situations among various players, as they attempt to create a 
specific structure that allows the market to function best (Cabantous and Gond 2009). Bringing 
together different principles and different interest groups can lead to hybrid practices, in which 
the logic of the “civic world” (e.g., finding a collective solution to drought problems in Africa) 
and the “market world” (e.g., building the best performing and most lucrative weather-
                                                                                                                                                             
according to RI principles across all their investments, or invest in both. invest generally according to RI principles 
across all their investments, or invest in both. 
3 In terms of financial value, depending on the accounting methods and the definitions adopted (according to several 
quantitative studies), RI represents between 1% and 10% of global financial assets (Giamporcaro 2006). Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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derivatives markets) mix in an unsatisfactory way. We argue here that a similar logic operates in 
the responsible investment sphere. More particularly, we argue that some behavioral 
impediments intrinsic to the market—identified by previous researchers (e.g., Guyatt 2006) as 
short-termism4 (myopic decisionmaking or discounting), herding,5 and over-reliance on 
defensive decisions or industry incentive structures (bonuses and benchmarks)—can contribute 
to investor reluctance to incorporate long-term extra-financial factors in their investment 
practices.  
Thus, those in favor of responsible investment need to support both political and 
calculative framings, in order to create a stronger case for further integration of social and 
environmental risks into the market. A new generation of financial analysts, asset managers, 
investment consultants, and pension-fund trustees—who are familiar with sustainability as a 
shareholder value maximization—is trying to construct, from inside the investment industry, 
“translation systems” that will enable principles and financial profit goals to coexist (Gond and 
Palazzo 2008). Based on this general insight, our paper attempts to explore the reality, 
characteristics, and links between three mechanisms involved in the social construction of 
markets:  1) political framing, 2) calculative framing, and 3) the role played by internal 
conventions in developing a responsible investment sector in South Africa.  
The South African asset-management industry is characterized by a small number (38) of 
socially-responsible investment products. The South African SRI market is focused on social 
transformation and development goals (investment in infrastructure) and has little interest in 
environmental risks. Nineteen asset management houses in South Africa signed on to the 
Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) in September 2009, following the example of the 
Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF),6 the largest institutional investor in Africa. 
As an empirical study, this paper is based on desktop and field research, which includes 
interviews with the South African signatories of the PRI and providers of SRI products. One of 
the goals of the interview process was to collect and analyze the positions and perceptions of 
                                                 
4 Short-termism is an approach to business that concentrates on short-term results over long-term objectives or 
ramifications. 
5 Herding is the tendency of individuals to follow the prevailing opinion or action. 
6 The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is Africa’s largest pension fund. It has more than 2 million 
active members, around 318,000 pensioners and beneficiaries, and assets worth SAR 700 billion (SAR = South 
African rand), http://www.gepf.gov.za/Pages/Home.aspx. Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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these companies concerning what encourages or blocks further commodification of 
environmental risks in the South African investment industry.  
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the paper analyzes how two processes of 
market creation (political and calculative framing) are mobilized by the market players we 
interviewed to deal with factors that enable or prevent the growth of an environmentally 
responsible investment (ERI) market in South Africa and how these processes are intertwined in 
their views. This complements some recent developments in economic sociology. Second, the 
paper explores the role of internal market conventions in the South African asset-management 
industry and contributes to the literature on the social construction of a responsible investment 
industry worldwide (Gond and Palazzo 2008; Giamporcaro 2006; Guyatt 2006; Louche 2004; 
Haigh 2005). Third, our empirical study also contributes to the literature on finance in 
developing countries by illustrating how an externalized object (here, environmental risks) can 
be better internalized in the specific context of a developing economy.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 outlines the theoretical issues that the 
research addresses and our research questions. Section 2 discusses the methods and data. The 
main results of the empirical research are presented in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 contains the 
results of the interviewee’s reactions to the quotations. Section 6 discusses how to make the shift 
to ERI in South Africa, and section 7 concludes.    
1.  Understanding the Emergence and Functioning of Markets  
On one hand, based on the theory of institutionalism, markets (including emerging 
markets) are embedded within a social and institutional context (Granovetter 1985, Fligstein 
1996), where highly political relationships between regulative bodies, government agencies, and 
organized business groups—all of which are trying to further their own interests—are established 
and determine the construction of markets through political framing (Cabantous   and Gond 
2009) that focuses on the enactment of a given governance structure (regulation or legislation).7  
On the other hand, a complementary approach to market emergence, referred to as the 
anthropology of markets in economic sociology literature (Callon 1998), has roots in the actor-
                                                 
7 For example, the creation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2001 was the political 
result of decisions made within European Union political structures and among European states and various business 
interest groups in order to tackle climate change (Braun 2009). Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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network theory8 (Latour 2005), where human and nonhuman elements together provide 
calculative framing structures that construct the market and make it function (Callon, Millo, and 
Muniesa 2007). According to this perspective, markets are conceived as “calculative collective 
devices,” which enable actors to make decisions by allowing the properties assessment of the 
goods to be exchanged (Callon and Muniesa 2005, 1229). Market calculative devices can take 
several shapes.9 The calculative feature makes it possible to understand financial derivatives 
(Beunza, Hardie, and MacKenzie 2006), the recent financial subprime bubble (Poon 2009), or 
the responsible investment movement (Giamporcaro 2006, Giamporcaro and Gond, 2010).  
Another framework around conventions, articulated by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), 
provides an additional perspective from which to analyze the views of investment companies 
about the incorporation of something usually considered external to the market (such as 
environmental risk). This framework postulates the existence of “different worlds,” where 
individuals and groups evolve under specific conditions and rules. Boltanski and Thévenot 
identified six “worlds”:  “market world,” “industrial world,” “civic world,” “world of fame,” 
“world of inspiration,” and the “domestic world” (ibid., back cover). Their framework focuses 
upon the imperative of justification as a necessary condition to coordinate human behavior.  
The justification process of each world is characterized by core principles that may be 
referred to in case of disputes, compromises, or agreements linking individuals that are part of 
these different worlds.10 The highest value and principle of the market world are performance 
and competition, respectively, made possible by the free circulation of goods and persons; 
                                                 
8 The actor-network theory (ANT) was initially created in an attempt to understand processes of innovation and 
knowledge-creation, drawing on studies of large technological systems. It advanced the idea that the objects of 
scientific study are socially constructed within the laboratory and do not exist outside the instruments that measure 
them and the minds that interpret them. The emphasis on human and nonhuman agencies was carried further in the 
1990s, notably in social studies of finance, to demonstrate that technological devices (computer software) and 
calculations methodologies based on financial theories (performed by traders, credit and equity financial analysts, 
and asset managers) are not neutral and have the power to shape markets in a specific way. As described by 
MacKenzie (2006), financial technological market devices function less as a camera than an engine.  
9 For instance, Karpik (2000) showed the crucial role of calculative and judgment devices, such as guides and 
classification schemes, in the supply and demand of the restaurant industry. To continue the EU ETS example, the 
anthropology of market studies shows how the human (market promoters, researchers, regulators) and nonhuman 
(calculation methodologies, financial markets) elements within the EU ETS function to make the concept of carbon 
credits calculable and exchangeable (Callon 2009, MacKenzie 2009). 
10 Picture, for example, a fund manager who needs to collaborate with an environmental non-governmental 
organization to launch a climate-change-friendly investment product. Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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whereas, the civic world is characterized by civic solidarity and unity.11 These two worlds apply 
best to our research exploring which factors (“civic world” and “market world” principles) can 
create an environmentally responsible investment market in South Africa.  
1.1  Political Framing (Politicization) versus Calculative Framing (Economization)   
Like the work of Cabantous and Gond (2009) on the internalization of terrorism risk by 
the insurance industry in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this paper analyzes 
both the role of political and calculative framing and their likely intertwining in the development 
of an environmentally responsible investment industry in South Africa. Cabantous and Gond 
(2009) suggested viewing the political-cultural approach to market construction as a specific case 
of framing. Framing has been defined in social movement theory as a strategic activity aimed at 
creating a structure that facilitates collective actions in relation to a given objective (Benford and 
Snow 2000). Constructing a political framework is a crucial condition for mobilizing people and 
resources around a given issue, for example, reaching a collective international agreement about 
climate change (Ostrom 2010). In this paper, we refer to this as political framing. We 
demonstrate and analyze how, in the view of the investment managers interviewed, the social 
construction of an environmentally-responsible investment sector is partly linked to the 
development of political frames around environmental risks.  
Calculative framing here refers to the specific action of extracting an entity (such as 
separating the various activities of a company from its social or local context), so that the carbon 
footprint of the same company can be calculated by the company’s accountants (via some 
appropriate system) and eventually be displayed in its annual report or communicated to 
interested parties (such as the Carbon Disclosure Project12). This type of framing is different 
from political framing because it is primarily used to solve a technical problem of calculation 
rather than reach a given political goal.  
                                                 
11 Unity around a general will can be reached through achievement of awareness, collective reflection, or 
mobilization around a cause. 
12 Since 2000, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) has challenged the world‘s largest companies to measure and 
report their carbon emissions on behalf of institutional investors. In 2009, backed by 475 institutional investors 
representing more than US$ 55 trillion in managed funds, CDP sent questionnaires to some 3,700 of the world’s 
largest companies. (In South Africa, the initiative targeted the 100 largest companies on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange.) In 2009, the response rate to the questionnaire was 68%, compared to 59% in 2008. By the end of 2009, 
seven South African investors had joined the CDP (CDP 2009). 
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Having said this, it can be argued that calculating an abstract concept involves an 
underlying political perspective. For example, converting an environmental risk (such as climate 
change) into mathematical figures that can be calculated consists of determining scientifically 
(and politically) which dimensions to include or exclude. The controversy over rising global 
temperatures and global warming, for example, as bruited by climate skeptics and critics, is an 
extreme example of the political game that can take place around scientific calculations (Callon 
2009; Lohman 2009; WBGU; 2010, 5). Isolating objects from their context, grouping them in the 
same frame, establishing original relations between them, classifying them, and summing them 
up are all costly activities that raise the question of the politics of calculative framing (Callon and 
Muniesa 2005, 1232).  
This paper explores whether the asset managers interviewed allotted any role to 
economization (calculative framing, which encompasses market principles) and politicization 
(political framing, which stimulates civic unity and political regulation around a given concern 
[Callon 2009]) in the commodification of environmental concerns in the investment industry in 
South Africa. 
1.2  Internal Conventions Embedded in Financial Markets  
Conventions are the schema shared by investors about how financial markets work and 
how investors are expected to behave (Keynes 1936). Consequently, in the study of markets, in 
order to understand how individuals behave, it is necessary to explore the justification process 
for their behavior (Boyer and Orléans 1996; Gomez and Jones 2000, Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006). According to Guyatt (2006), the justification process is a crucial component of how 
conventions are sustained in institutional investment, since agents in the institutional investment 
chain will always be accountable to others for their financial performance. Indeed, in the 
investment value chain, asset managers are accountable to multi-managers and investment 
consultants, who are themselves accountable to pension funds and other retirement or saving 
schemes that, in turn, are eventually accountable to the final beneficiaries. When studying 
investor behavior, it is relevant to consider the interactions between behavior, conventions, 
beliefs, and justification in a nonlinear way.  Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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Thus, our research also included verifying whether certain behavioral and organizational 
impediments13 to long-term responsible investment strategies that include environmental risk can 
be identified for South African investors. We sought to answer these three questions:   
1.   Is political or calculative framing considered by investment market players to be a 
solution to further commodification of environmental concerns in the investment 
industry, and to what extent?  
2.   Do the South African investment companies interviewed feel that economization and 
politicization prevent or accelerate further commodification of environmental 
concerns in the investment industry?   
3.   What is the role played by the behavioral and organizational conventions shared by 
investment professionals in a developing SRI market, such as South Africa?   
2. Method and Data  
We conducted our study between June and December 2009 through desktop research and 
interviews. The desktop research primarily measured the size and trends of the South African 
SRI-fund market to get an initial idea of the integration of environmental issues. The first goal of 
the interview process was to further explore the environmentally-responsible investment 
practices adopted by responsible investors and to complete the results gathered via the desktop 
research. The second goal was to collect the opinions of those interviewed on the 
commodification of environmental risks in the South African investment industry. These latter 
results are the topic of this paper. 
2.1  Desktop Research  
We searched the websites of our sample of South African asset managers and SRI fund 
providers to look at their quarterly reports, fund fact sheets, and investment policy statements. A 
database of asset managers was then created, which included PRI signatories, as well as asset 
managers that are not PRI signatories, but still offer SRI products. The database quantified each 
asset manager’s involvement in SRI, if any, and outlined the strategies adopted and the scope 
and focus of these funds. On the pension fund side, we further examined the websites of the 
                                                 
13 As noted earlier,  financial market short-termism, herding, over-reliance on defensive decisions, and an 
organization’s own incentive structures (Guyatt 2006 and others). Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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relevant bodies, plus legal documents and National Treasury discussion papers on pension fund 
legislation. The desktop research was supplemented by relevant international and local literature.  
2.2  Interviews with Responsible Investors  
As with Rainelli-Le Montagner and Huault’s (2010, forthcoming) work on weather 
derivative markets or MacKenzie’s study of carbon markets (2009), interviewing was necessary 
because neither media nor academic sources were sufficient to answer our research questions.14 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted mainly with PRI signatories, noted on the PRI website. 
(Signatories are classified by the PRI initiative into three categories:  asset owners, investment 
managers, and professional service partners.)  
We targeted the organizations that willingly made the decision to sign the PRI principles 
because we assumed, based on previous research experience in France (Giamporcaro 2006),15 
that they had a more sophisticated understanding and analysis of the integration of environmental 
concerns into investment decisionmaking processes and shareholder practices. Nevertheless, 
because investment managers represent the major bulk of PRI signatories and were our principal 
focus, we also decided to include other investment managers, which are not signatories of the 
PRI, but offer SRI investment products, plus the 20 biggest investment managers in South Africa 
(according to an Alexander Forbes institutional investment survey conducted at the end of 
December 2008).  
The idea behind including this last group was to establish whether any of the largest 
South African asset management houses was in the process of signing the PRI or developing an 
SRI product. The strategy paid off, since we were able to identify one asset management house 
preparing to sign the PRI. Finally, from a sample of 34 organizations, we conducted 22 face-to-
face or telephone interviews (65 percent) between August and December 2009 in Johannesburg 
and Cape Town.  
Of these, we reached 12 of the 19 investment managers, 1 of the 2 asset owners, and 3 of 
the 6 partner service-providers listed as South African PRI signatories at beginning of March 
                                                 
14 Qualitative methodologies are well suited to provide context, vivid descriptions, and dynamic structures of the 
socially-constructed practices and representations of the people working in organizations (Locke 2001). 
15 The author, Stephanie Giamporcaro (2006), conducted PhD research from 2002 to 2005 with similar interviews 
and field survey of French responsible investors. This earlier experience informed field research choices made for 
the South African study.  Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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2009. (Two asset managers interviewed, however, were no longer listed as PRI signatories in 
July 2009, but two new asset managers had signed.) Even though the research sample is strongly 
biased towards signatories of the PRI, it should be emphasized that it does not mean that the 
survey targeted a marginal community of investors. Indeed, in terms of overall reach of the 
South African investment industry, the field survey reached 60 percent of the 20 biggest South 
African management houses, as of December 2008 (Alexander Forbes 2008).  
2.3  Characteristics of the Respondents 
Interviews were fully transcribed and on average lasted 90 minutes. Anonymity was 
guaranteed to the respondents, meaning that verbatim quotes would not be linked to them or their 
organizations. When we include a quote here, it is identified by a number, for example, 
Respondent 1 or Respondent 8. We do include a list of the organizations targeted and 
interviewed in appendix 2. 
From the 22 organizations that participated in the research, we interviewed 35 
individuals. Portfolio managers (31 percent) and financial analysts (26 percent) represented the 
largest share of those interviewed. Chief investment officers (14 percent) and chief executive 
officers (17 percent), usually accompanied by their staff, responded directly to our questions, 
showing that the interest for responsible investment questions was embraced at the higher levels 
of the organizations.  
Another interesting fact to note is that of the 35 individuals interviewed, 40 percent said 
that they led the SRI in their organizations, indicating advanced awareness of RI issues. It also 
appears that the majority of the professionals we met were quite senior in the asset management 
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Figure 1. Investment Experience of the Survey Sample  
 
Note:  AM = asset management. 
Source:  Author’s own research and calculations. 
We also asked questions during the interview about asset management style, stock-
picking techniques, and investment constraints adopted. Almost all (14 of 15) the investment 
managers (excluding multi-fund managers) declared that they implemented active asset-
management techniques rather than passive techniques. Among the 14 active investment 
managers, six organizations described using a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques, and 
seven used only qualitative techniques, such as fundamental analysis of companies. Two houses 
declared that they also implemented hedging techniques. Only one organization described itself 
as a purely quantitative house (Aaron and Ali 2005). Even though it cannot be strictly 
statistically proven with this small qualitative sample from South Africa, it appeared (as also 
seen in France by Giamporcaro 2006) that generally qualitative stock-picking techniques share 
common ground with RI principles because they both rely on the necessity of in-depth analysis 
of companies. 
2.4  Interview Process and Research Questions on Opinions 
The interviews were semi-structured:  we asked some closed questions, while other 
questions let the interviewees develop their own thinking on a specific point. The fact that 
interviewees presented a diversified range of practices and opinions concerning environmentally 
responsible investment posed challenges to the interview guidelines. The major difficulty was 
keeping the discussion focused precisely on environmentally-responsible investment opinions, Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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instead of more general views. Thus, although we devised a strictly structured interview process, 
we adapted it for each interviewee, in case certain questions were not relevant for them. 
Nevertheless, the interviews basically followed the steps in table 1.  
Table 1. Interview Guideline Framework 
Part 1:  Detailed information gathered on each 
respondent 
Age, training, job function, and experience in the 
investment industry and the organization 
Part 2:  Detailed Information on the organization of 
each respondent 
Asset management style, asset allocation, 
geographical zone of investment, clients, and 
investment philosophy  
Part 3:  Definition of responsible investment and 
environmental themes.  
Spontaneous definition of SRI and RI, reaction to a 
specific definition of SRI, spontaneous definition of 
environmental themes 
Part 4:  Environmentally-responsible investment 
practices 
Current SRI products and how supplied, RI philosophy, 
and integration of environmental concerns in the 
current SRI products 
Part 5:  General views on the future development of 
environmentally responsible approaches    Answers specific to each interviewee 
Part 6:  Identification of obstacles and enablers to a 
further integration of environmental concerns  
“According to you, what are the main obstacles and 
enablers to further environmental concerns integration 
in the investment industry?”  
Part 7:  Reaction to a set of obstacles and enablers to 
environmentally-responsible investment, as identified 
in the academic literature through a series of 
illustrative quotes  
Short-termism of the financial market, herding and 
peer and client pressure, incentive structures  
The qualitative data about the identification of obstacles and enablers of ERI, gathered in 
our semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, were analyzed through a process of analytical 
induction, or grounded theory (Haig 1995; Jankowicz 2005). After an initial textual analysis, we 
noted and interpreted a range of political and calculative framing and internal conventions, 
identified by the investment players interviewed as likely to prevent or accelerate the 
internalization of environmental risks in the South African investment industry.  
It is important to note that we created a unique section for part 7 of the interview. 
Interviewees were asked to read and respond to quotes by finance professionals in the academic 
literature. (We used the quotes instead of research questions—such as “do you think that short-
termism of the financial market represents an obstacle to environmentally responsible 
approaches”— to break up the routine of the interviews, inject an element of fun, and engage 
more directly the interviewees.) Each quote illustrated a specific obstacle or enabler identified in 
the literature (Giamporcaro 2006; Guyatt 2006; Viviers 2007; Wildsmith 2008).  Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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 Interviewees were asked whether they agreed or not with the quote, whether they had 
experienced such obstacles or enablers in their work, and whether they thought that being a 
South African portfolio manager influenced their point of view. The research protocol we 
designed was quite demanding because the interviewees had to read and to react quickly to quite 
complex assertions. We expected that this part of the research protocol had a significant chance 
of being rejected by a large number of the participants. However, even though the level of 
commitment and lightheartedness varied from one interviewee to another, it was well received 
and led to interesting reactions and research results. These imposed themes, which were included 
to test the relevancy of previous empirical results in the responsible investment literature, were 
classified on an agreement-disagreement scale, based on an analysis of the justification 
arguments used by the interviewees.  
3. Research Background  
Two efficient ways to understand the overall commitment to responsible investment in a 
country are to get a sense of the size and trends of its SRI funds market and to determine whether 
the institutional investment community is open to adopting the Principles for Responsible 
Investment. Regarding the SRI market, we identified 38 SRI products in South Africa, with a 
market value of SAR 23.28 billion (as of July 2009); the majority of which were created in the 
last six years. This figure represents approximately 1.04 percent of total investments in the 
country.  
The SRI market is strongly driven by a focus on social transformation through black 
empowerment policies and development goals (investment in infrastructure), and currently 
shows little interest in environmental challenges (Giamporcaro, Pretorius, and Visser 2010). In 
terms of corporate social responsibility rating tools, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), in 
partnership with Eiris (a British CSR rating agency), provides a socially responsible investor 
index, consisting of companies that qualify as responsible per the rating methodology adopted 
(Sonnenberg and Hamman 2006), to measure concerns for environmental management. This 
index is widely used by responsible investors that manage listed equities assets. In terms of the 
responsible investment strategies, most products direct investment to companies, sectors, or 
projects showing a positive impact in social transformation and development goals.  
Another strategy—notably adopted by GEPF—is active share ownership, consisting 
mainly of talking to companies and voting at their annual general meetings in order to influence 
the companies’ behavior in social, environmental, and corporate governance matters. Today, 
active share ownership in South Africa is strongly focused on corporate governance. However, Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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the focus should soon widen to include social and environmental concerns, such as climate 
change, with the launch of GEPF’s Responsible Investment Charter in June 2010.  
Nineteen South African asset management houses are signatories to PRI. This is a 
substantial level of adoption for an emerging country and is due primarily to the adoption of PRI 
by GEPF in 2007 and its subsequent call for tender that asked for the PRI status of the candidates 
(Wildsmith 2008).   
As background to the survey participants’ views on whether political and calculative 
framing would enhance or prevent integration of environmental concerns in the investment 
industry, it is interesting to describe their answers to the following questions. 
Question 1:  “Do you wish to see growth in environmentally responsible approaches 
in the South African investment industry?” 
Not surprisingly, since the sample is inherently biased toward responsible investment, 19 
of the organizations interviewed expressed a willingness to see greater implementation of 
responsible investment approaches. Two individuals interviewed emphasized that they wished, 
above all, that the responsible investment movement could be mainstreamed, including 
environmentally responsible investment. Only three interviewees were indifferent to ERI. 
Questioned about the likelihood of environmentally responsible investment growing in the 
coming years, most answers were similarly optimistic. 
Question 2:  “Do you think there will be growth of environmentally responsible 
approaches in the South African investment industry?”   
One interviewee was indifferent; three declared their incredulity that environmentally 
responsible investment even had a future in the South African investment industry. On the 
positive side, 18 other organization representatives were convinced that ERI was likely to grow 
in South Africa. However, this optimism included a range of preconditions. One fact emphasized 
by a majority of the interviewees was that such growth would not be vibrant in the short term, 
that it will take 10–15 years to see a real transformation in the investment industry regarding 
environmentally responsible investment. Three interviewees noted more specifically that the ERI 
growth would not happen if political framing, such as governmental legislation, did not occur. 
As one of these individuals put it, “the growth will happen, but only if government put[s] in 
place a proactive environmental regulation in the [next] five years” (Respondent 10).  
Two interviewees pointed out that ERI growth will be linked to whether the South 
African pension fund industry commits to invest in an environmentally responsible way, but two Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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others disagreed. They felt that, in South Africa, social priorities are so urgent that environmental 
concerns are not considered a priority:  “I do not expect to see it happening any time soon, since 
in South Africa there are a lot of things to deal with, such as job creation, empowerment, and 
services delivery. Environment will be, maybe, at the top of the agenda of the investment 
industry in 15 years” (Respondent 15). Two different interviewees asserted that in the future the 
growing integration of responsible investment approaches should focus on the rising question of 
climate change.  
4.  The Civic World versus the Market World  
The two closed questions above were followed by open questions on the identification of 
obstacles and enablers to a further integration of environmental concerns in the investment 
industry at international and national investment industry levels and inside the respondent 
organizations. Confronted with the open questions, respondents depicted a worldwide situation 
divided between civic world and market world logics that were presented as preventing or 
accelerating further integration of ERI. 
4.1  The Civic World and the Logic for Politicization 
It appeared that for some respondents the current growing unity of the civic world around 
environmental issues and the unfolding civil society awareness and political willingness will be 
largely influential at the international level. The role that could be played by the United States, 
led by President Barack Obama, is viewed by many interviewees as a potential leading force for 
transformation that could, however, be mitigated by the economic recession prevailing at the 
time of the interviews.  
The civic world in developing nations is not necessarily perceived as a force of change by 
the respondents. They made the point that emerging countries, including South Africa, due to 
their development and economic agendas, are not in the same place as the developed countries’ 
civic world in awareness of environmental issues. They may actually oppose further integration 
of environmental concerns, given the greater political priority of development goals. These goals 
can limit civil and political awareness around environmental issues, which are perceived largely 
as concerns of the “rich.”  As Respondent 11 noted, “the main obstacle in South Africa is that 
there are too much more urgent concerns, such as job creation and poverty alleviation. It is a 
[developing] state where some people are still cooking with coal.” Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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The interviewees pointed out that international awareness around climate change could 
stimulate the South African government to adopt similar standards as the Western world on the 
environment and climate change: 
A thing that could play is the willingness of the South African government to be seen by the 
external world as an advanced country. The anti-smoking situation in South Africa speaks for it. 
You can not seriously demonstrate that implementing non-smoking policies in South Africa was a 
priority for a massive amount of voters. Nevertheless, the government went for it in a kind of 
drastic way. It could be the same with environmental issues, just to prove that we are an advanced 
country (Respondent 14). 
In terms of the logic for regulation at the international level, stronger environmental 
legislation aiming to enhance the degree of corporate disclosure was proposed as a way to push 
the investment industry to internalize environmental costs in their investment decisionmaking. 
The political role played by the United Nation Environmental Programme’s Finance Initiative 
(UNEP-FI), which mobilized not only investment professionals but also the biggest financial, 
insurance, and banking players in the world around environmental matters, was stressed by some 
respondents.  
At the national level, greater environmental disclosure required from companies is 
viewed by some respondents as the best prescription to follow, even though it is difficult to 
obtain, considering the general unwillingness of businesses to comply with mandatory 
requirements. Compliance business codes, such as King III (2009),16 are thus presented as the 
soft way to achieve the same results through collaboration.  
As much as investment players are generally keen to see further environmental regulation 
applied to corporations they invest in, generally they are reluctant to see hard regulation 
introduced into the South African investment industry. This is particularly illustrated by the 
industry’s lively opposition to a proposal to amend Regulation 28 of the South African Pension 
Funds Act. This amendment proposes asset allocation requirements on pension funds. It suggests 
                                                 
16 Institute of Directors in South Africa, 2009, “King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009” (King III) 
(Pretoria, South Africa:  Institute of Directors). “The King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) 
provides a list of best practice principles to assist and guide directors to make the right choice for their 
company…on various governance-related aspects, including ethical leadership and corporate citizenship; boards and 
directors; audit committees; the governance of risk; the governance of information technology (IT); compliance with 
laws, rules, codes and standards; internal audit; governing stakeholder relationships; and integrated reporting and 
disclosure” (Deloitte.com, 2009, “King III 2009:  Every decision counts,” 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_ZA/za/services/audit/deloitteaudit/kingiii/index.htm). Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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that 5 percent of the pension fund assets that are subject to Regulation 28 should be invested in 
socially responsible assets. Most of our respondents rejected this strong political framing in the 
name of market competition and freedom of investment. They described this situation, where 
investment allocation is decided by political interest groups, as leading to price distortion and an 
uncompetitive environment, which in turn could damage the still-fragile reputation of 
responsible investment and SRI funds in South Africa. They also believed it will not achieve the 
desirable financial performance:   
The idea to say to institutional investors to invest 5 percent of their money in SRI does not sound 
like the right approach. Why 5 percent and not 10 percent or 20 percent? Each pension fund 
should decide what is right for its unique membership. You have to imagine that if you force 
them to do it and it goes wrong, it could be very bad. It has to be self-compliance. Maybe some 
obligation to disclose what you do in terms of SRI could lead them to start to apply their mind on 
the subject (Respondent 17).  
The respondents made it very clear that they prefer the existing soft regulation tools, such 
as the Financial Sector Charter (2003)17 or PRI principles (2006). 
 Another solution offered is the creation of a “comply or explain” regulatory framework, 
similar to what exists in France (Giamporcaro 2006) and the United Kingdom. This regulation 
asks pension funds to explain whether they are taking ESG issues into account in their 
investment strategies (yes or no), and if yes, how they are doing it.  
However, a small number of the respondents viewed the proposed Regulation 28 
amendment as desirable, in the sense that it could be a starting point to oblige South African 
pension funds to apply serious attention to SRI. “Even if there is a lot of criticism about the 5-
percent SRI assets, maybe it will be actually not such a bad thing. At least, it will get the pension 
fund industry to start to think about how they are going to tick the box” (Respondent 6). It could 
                                                 
17 In August 2002, the South African financial sector committed itself to the development of black economic 
empowerment (BEE), via the “Financial Sector Charter.” BEE is aimed at addressing inequalities in South Africa 
through sustained economic growth, development, and social transformation. The Financial Sector Charter advocate 
s targeted investment in infrastructure projects (such as transportation, telecommunications, water and sanitation, 
energy, health services, education, correctional facilities, and municipal services) that support economic 
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also help clarify the definitions of what the SRI and RI concepts cover, since there is still a high 
level of confusion on the matter, notably in the pension fund industry. 
4.2  Market World and the Logic for Economicization  
On the corporation side, market players are depicted by many as reluctant to internalize 
environmental risks in their operations, particularly during an economic recession. On the 
investment industry side, lack of education leading to the perception that responsible investment 
approaches and SRI products mean a trade-off between financial performance and civic 
aspirations is identified as one of the major obstacles for further integrating environmental 
concerns in the local South African investment world. Nonetheless, some positive forces of 
change, led by market players, such as the commitment of the Government Employee Pension 
Fund to PRI principles and the creation of the South African PRI network, are identified in the 
South African investment context: 
GEPF is going to be the main factor in South Africa. GEPF is the biggest investor in South 
Africa. If they really decide to make a change on environmental issues, they can make their point 
quickly to companies and get them to change. They [the companies] will have to speak the 
language that GEPF want[s] them to speak. If GEPF decides that disclosing your carbon footprint 
could be a matter of importance, it will become one (Respondent 14).  
Demonstrating scientifically the positive link between environmental risks and share 
value and share price is presented by some respondents as the best way to disprove the trade-off 
belief. They pointed out that several practical obstacles still lie between investment players and 
adequate investment analysis models, such as proper access to standardized and comparable 
environmental data in South Africa. They raised clear concerns about the willingness of 
institutional clients to assume the actual costs that will necessarily unfold, if such calculative 
efforts were to be deployed in asset management houses.  
On the other hand, some respondents also stressed that, considering it can already be 
proven that responsible investment approaches do not interfere with financial performance goals 
(Viviers 2006), the real challenge is to redefine what is considered fiduciary duty in South 
Africa. Indeed, in the institutional investment context ruled by common law, trustees of funds 
have a fiduciary duty to exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in pursuing an overall 
investment strategy suitable to the purpose of the trust and to act prudently and for a proper 
purpose. In order to act in a prudent way and fulfill their fiduciary obligations, responsible 
investment proponents argue that investors should not only aim for the best financial 
performance in the short term but also integrate environmental, social, and corporate governance Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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issues that can come into play in long-term financial performance (Viederman 2009; Freshfield 
2005; UNEP-FI 2009). 
Some interviewees eventually made a link between political and economic framing by 
arguing that, at the present stage, subjecting companies to further environmental disclosure 
requirements will help investors by developing a basis for what should be considered 
compulsory disclosure. Binding environmental regulation that goes further than minimum 
disclosure requirements was also presented by Respondent 10 as the most efficient way to avoid 
a “tragedy of the commons” scenario (popularized by Hardin 1968) by giving regulatory costs to 
environmental risks, such as carbon emissions or water pollution. The example of environmental 
safety regulations passed in South Africa was notably pointed to as a practical example on how 
corporations and investors are eventually compelled to internalize environmental safety costs the 
moment the government passes such a law. “Companies do not care because there is no real 
regulatory framework to make them take into account their huge impact on the environment. If 
you do not have a strong regulatory environment, companies are not likely to change. It can be 
summarized by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ dilemma” (Respondent 10). 
It is interesting to note that, as stressed by Ostrom and Basurto (2009), “the tragedy of the 
commons” taught everywhere in economics was identified as a universal phenomenon by 
Respondent 10. This same respondent also proposed a local version of the “tragedy of the 
commons” remedy, which is not privatization of environmental resources (economization) but 
further governmental regulation (politicization):  
You really need to make the link between environmental risks and stock valuation, but you will 
need regulation to see a pricing of the problem. You have to be realistic if there is no regulation. 
If you have a situation where one company is really doing something responsible with its water 
management and the other one is not, as an investor, you are going to go for the one who makes 
the most money, no matter what. But if [the] government make[s] the behavior of the bad 
companies unacceptable, it changes everything. Now, to manage badly, your water could be 
costly and you could be fined for it. Investors will react to such a risk” (Respondent 10).  
The analysis in table 2 of obstacles and enablers spontaneously identified by the asset 
managers clearly shows that local investment players favor soft political framing solutions as 
preconditions to further commodification of environmental risks by the market, particularly in a 
developing country such as South Africa. Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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Table 2. Themes and Sub-themes Identified through Textual Thematic  
Analysis of the Interviews      
Theme   Subthemes  
No awareness and unity in civil society:  
environment is not a common concern. 
International:  Lack of civil society understanding, lack of political 
will during the recession, priorities of emerging countries to develop 
their economies versus environmental threats  
National:  Lack of understanding, political will focused on solving 
social problems, such as job creation and poverty alleviation  
Strong awareness and unity in civil 
society:  environment is a common 
concern. 
International: Civil society pressure, political momentum from the 
Obama administration  
National: No patterns of strong awareness mentioned  
Lack of political framing for 
environmental issues 
International:  Lack of investment in education about responsible 
investment, lack of environmental disclosure from corporations 
National:  Lack of South African environmental regulations 
Identification of drivers of political 
framing  (for environmental issues) 
International: Education, United Nations influence through UNEP-FI 
and PRI, further environmental legislation/regulation that creates a 
compliance framework for investors   
National: Education, national and international consumer pressure, 
political vision regarding climate change, further environmental 
regulations for disclosure by corporations, Financial Sector Charter, 
King III report, GEPF political influence, soft regulation framework 
for institutional investors that redefines fiduciary duty and retirement 
regulation  
Tension around political framing 
solutions (for environmental concerns) 
International: Discrepancy between South and North political 
agendas in the terms of economic priorities 
National: More urgent social priorities, government versus private 
sector auto regulation   
National investment sphere: Hot debate around South Africa’s 
Regulation 28 proposing SRI-prescribed assets, debate on fiduciary 
duty definition  
Resistance of the market world; 
environmental concerns cannot be 
assimilated into the market as a 
consideration for investment 
International:  Current financial crisis and economic recession, 
corporate lobbies, strength of the trade-off view, competition of the 
asset management industry  
National:   Lobbies, lack of education of pension fund trustees about 
SRI and RI, cynicism of pension fund trustees, confusion on RI and 
SRI concepts and strength of the trade-off view, apathy of the 
financial consulting industry, competition among asset management 
companies  
Firm level:  Top management skepticism, limited investor demand, 
lack of actual ERI opportunities    
Identification of changing forces and 
new actors in the market 
International:  New generation of green entrepreneurs, institutional 
investors united in international networks (UNEP-FI, PRI)  
National:  Institutional asset owners (GEPF and parastatal pension 
funds), South African PRI network united around GEPF, asset 
management professional bodies (ASISA), international pressure 
and consumer demand   
Firm level: Top-level management conviction, human skills, clients 
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Lack of calculative framing for 
environmental issues 
International:  Absence of international standardization of 
environmental data, lack of understanding of the link between 
environmental risks and long-term value of corporations  
National/firm level:  Lack of access to standardized environmental 
data, lack of human skills to analyze the data 
Tension around calculative framing 
solutions (for environmental issues) 
National/firm level:  Demonstrating the positive link between 
environmental commodification and financial profit, figuring out who 
finances the effort of calculative framing  
Possible links between political and 
calculative framing  
Successful commodification of environmental risks in the market 
sphere only achievable if environmental regulation is implemented 
The following section analyzes the reactions by the survey sample to a number of quotes, 
which argue that the dominant conventions of short-termism and herding represent major internal 
obstacles in the investment industry to further commodification of environmental risks.  
5.  What Role for Dominant Conventions?  Focus on Financial Market Short-
Termism and Herding 
In her empirical case study among U.K. institutional investors, Guyatt (2006) was able to 
determine that short-termism of financial markets and herding tendencies were overarching 
conventions identified by investors (interviewed in her research) to justify their reluctance to 
adopt responsible investment behavior.  
Fund managers generally adopt myopic behavior, amounting to an overemphasis of the 
short-term movements on financial markets, notably fuelled by the use of valuation models 
designed to exploit short-term mispricing in the market. This discounting behavior is also driven 
by the fact that performance of active investors is primarily reviewed and measured on the basis 
of their ability to out-perform an index over a one-year period. This incentive system provides 
fund managers with little incentive to challenge the dominant conventions that prevail in the 
market.  
Beside short-termism, fund managers have a tendency to gravitate toward defensible 
decisions that might cause investors to “stick with the herd,” based on the assumption that 
conventional criteria will be easier to defend than those that are unconventional or go against 
prevailing consensus opinion, such as responsible investment principles. As highlighted by 
Keynes (1936, 158), “worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”  
Our research attempted to check whether the South African responsible investor sample 
would identify short-termism (financial market and incentives structures) and herding (peer and 
client pressure) as major obstacles to further integration of ERI approaches in their organizations, Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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after reading quotes by international asset managers on the subject. The respondents were asked 
if they agreed with the quotes, if they had experienced similar situations as the international 
financial professionals, and if they believed that being a South African investment manager 
changed their perceptions. Only 15 respondents, who were directly responsible for managing 
funds, were asked to react to quotes. (Some respondents did not give any reaction and were 
classified as “no reaction” in the following figures.)  
Myopic and discounting behaviors in financial markets were generally recognized by the 
respondents and identified as serious obstacles to ERI (figure 2).  
Figure 2. Financial Market Short-Termism:  Quote 1 
 “The big difficulty is that a lot of environmental issues play out over a very long period of time…It is 
only one factor in the process and if the market isn’t looking at it, you can sit there for a very long 
time on your high horse saying ‘this company is a disaster, it shouldn’t be trusted’ and you can lose 
your investors an awful lot of money…” – International asset manager 1  
 
Source:  Author’s own research and calculations. 
Agreeing partially, Respondent 5 nonetheless deconstructed the flaws that he identified in 
such short-term thinking that do not allow seeing further than immediate financial profit:  “The 
problem today is that financial players want to maximize their profit today. They do not want to 
maximize the shareholder value, but they want to only maximize their benefit. If you really want 
to maximize the shareholder value, you have to think on a longer term, at least five years, and 
take into account discounting risk.”  
The same point was made by Respondent 14:  
This is the question of short term versus long term. The question is finally what your time horizon 
is as an investor. If I take the example of a mining company and how it will be compliant on the Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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question of rehabilitating land, my perspective changes according to my time horizon. Right now, 
and even in five years time, it will have no real or a low impact on the share price, but maybe in 
15 years time, it is going to be the case. At the end of the day, it is not about the fact that they 
[companies] are doing well with the environment but about the investment returns that you are 
going to get by taking into account the environmental factor. 
Herding pressure was recognized, but was seen by a majority of fund managers 
interviewed as incompatible with the mission of an active asset-management house, which is 
defined as being contrarian to financial markets and being able to believe in its choices, no 
matter the peer pressure (figure 3).  
Figure 3. Herding Pressure:  Quote 2 
“On these new environmental questions, you have to get it absolutely right; otherwise, you can get 
talked out of it quickly. Well, not really talked out if it, but questions from the other asset managers, 
your boss, your clients on why on earth are you in this thing will follow. It would be easier with clear 
signals from your peers, the [investment company] directors, and above all the clients that you 
should go for it.” – International asset manager 2 
 
Source:  Author’s own research and calculations. 
In their comments, Respondents 10 and 16 strongly linked overarching short-termism and 
herding practiced by financial players to the incentive structures of the asset management 
industry (figure 4).  Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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Figure 4. Incentive Structures of the Financial Industry:  Quote 3 
“As a manager of a SRI fund, I have more constraints than other funds managers because 
there are some stocks that I have to avoid, according to environmental risk concerns, or I will 
overweight a position because I believe in the environmental strategy of the firm. Meantime, I am 
judged by my boss and clients on my relative performance compared to the returns of an index that 
is not tailored specifically for SRI funds. In addition, the official discourse is to say that SRI should 
be long-term investing, but we all know perfectly well that we are judged every quarter in 
comparison to these broad reference benchmarks, and that our bonus depends on our ability yearly 
to outperform the benchmark index." – Foreigner asset manager 3 
 
Source:  Author’s own research and calculations. 
The asset management industry is described by Respondent 16 as a value chain 
consisting of asset managers, multi-managers, and investment advisers that are supposed to 
satisfy, at the top of the chain, the final beneficiaries or final investors who tend to want to see 
positive financial results on a quarterly basis:  “Short-termism is the biggest problem faced by 
the investment industry. We really try to push against it and to let fund managers know that we 
are not going to judge them on short term. But, the problem is that the investment industry is a 
value chain. You need to keep happy the clients at the top of the chain. This is why the industry 
as a whole needs to change perspective.” 
The asset managers we interviewed seem to feel that what is largely needed in South 
Africa is a broader base of clients willing to see responsible investment mandates implemented 
by their asset management companies and able to detach themselves from quarterly benchmark 
comparisons with financial indexes that do not have the same investment constraints. Per 
Respondent 10, “this is a very important and key point for an asset manager—the way [our] 
performance is going to be benchmarked in comparison to peers and indexes. It is a real question 
to explore, if one wants to see an integration of ESG into the investment decision process in 
South Africa.”  Nevertheless, most of the respondents did not feel extremely concerned by the 
experience of European fund managers, who are obliged to apply a systematic selection process Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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based on ESG ratings of companies, since today they are mostly committed to implementing a 
punctual screening of the listed equities.  
Respondent 14 pointed out in some detail that, on the equities side, the extremely 
concentrated South African financial market structure would not actually allow thorough 
screening strategies, such as those implemented in Europe. Asset managers of listed equities 
would rather engage with companies on environmental issues, which does not imply a systematic 
integration in the stock selection process, but can, in case of disagreement with the companies, 
allow withdrawal from the share.  
On the bonds side, South African responsible asset managers, which target development 
infrastructure, clearly said that their investment constraints and incentive structures were not 
comparable with those on the listed equities side, and therefore they experienced broader 
freedom to invest on a longer-term basis with the consent of their clients.  
After analyzing the reactions of the interviewee sample that participated in responding to 
the international asset manager quotes, two different responsible investment profiles emerged. A 
minority of the group recognized the reality of behavioral and organizational short-termism, but 
argued that individually it was possible to think and to act out of the box, fuelled by the 
conviction that environmental concerns will matter in the long term. A majority, while conceding 
the existence of short-termism, wanted to wait for clear signals from the market (institutional 
clients at the top of the value chain) and civic world (government regulation) before committing 
to further develop ERI approaches.  
 6.    Discussion:  How to Stimulate Acceptance of Environmental Concerns in the 
South African Investment Industry?  
At the national level, one of the main political-framing enabler is to compel investors to 
price environmental risk by requiring stronger environmental disclosure from companies and 
passing more binding environmental regulation. Another political framing enabler is a stronger 
commitment by institutional investors to follow the GEPF example and greater willingness to 
implement responsible investment strategies.  
The lack of interest and skepticism of institutional clients and the local investment 
consulting industry in responsible investment is a major market impediment in South Africa. 
Some respondents emphasized that there is still too strong a belief that investors will lose their 
beneficiaries’ money if they make social and environmental concerns a focus of their investment 
decisions.  Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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The chance that broader commodification will occur in the calculative framing of the 
South African investment industry—beyond the growing but still small ranks of responsible 
investors—seems to be linked to realization of an adequate political framing. This means 
legislating standardized environmental disclosures by corporations and a long-term commitment 
by institutional investors to responsible investment philosophies.  
Some cultural characteristics of the still-developing state of South Africa pose a problem 
in the opinion of the interviewees. Belief by both civil society and the market that South Africa 
needs to deal with more urgent social priorities, such as social transformation and infrastructure 
improvement, will block environmental concerns from reaching the top of the agenda. The 
tension between social developmental goals and environmental goals is a major political obstacle 
at the national level. 
Other respondents, however, argued that this was short-sighted and that the impoverished 
sectors of the population would be the first to be impacted by the destruction of their natural 
environment and surroundings. Similarly, GEPF representatives have argued in a public forum18 
that climate change can have a tremendous negative social impact on the lives of the most 
disadvantaged people of South Africa by boosting food and water insecurity. They emphasized 
that long-term investors need to be willing to proactively adopt investment strategies that 
mitigate the consequences of climate change. This can make the level of savings provided by 
GEPF to its beneficiaries irrelevant, in the face of increasing food price inflation.  
What development path will the political and economic leaders of South Africa decide to 
follow is one of the core questions to ask. The financing and investment decisions made now in 
South Africa will shape the lives and the landscape experienced by both rich and poor for a long 
time. Education, awareness, regulation, breaking clichés, and injecting human and financial 
means can help stimulate a shift in the South Africa investment industry toward consideration of 
environmental issues. The final question may ultimately boil down to the choices of political, 
industry, and civic leaders, and to the choices that each fund manager makes about which 
companies to invest in. 
                                                 
18 2009 UNEP-FI conference, Cape Town, South Africa, October 2009, 
http://www.unepfi.org/events/2009/roundtable/index.html 
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7.  Conclusion 
This paper, with its qualitative empirical research, aims to contribute to the economic 
sociology literature on finance. Like Rainelli-Le Montagner and Huault (2010, forthcoming), and 
Cabantous and Gond (2009), we have documented the specific circumstances of the 
commodification of a risk that was judged, until recently, as external to the market sphere. The 
major difference is that this paper does not focus on the specific risk (e.g., extreme weather risk 
affecting the derivatives markets or the risk of an act of terrorism affecting the insurance 
industry), but looks more at what should be done to commodify environmental risk in the South 
African investment industry.  
Our study offers some insight into how politicization and economization mechanisms 
work together, in the context of a developing economy, to bring deeply-rooted societal concern 
for environmental issues into the investment market. It also looks at, on the micro-level, the 
behavioral and organizational impediments embedded in financial markets that stand in the way 
of commodifying environmental concerns in the investment market. It contributes to the socially-
responsible investment literature (Guyatt 2006; Wildsmith 2008) with its detailed analysis of the 
long- and short-term considerations that South African asset managers think are likely to impact 
their investment decisionmaking. Further research is needed, particularly surveying a larger 
sample of investment organizations (both responsible investment and standard investment 
companies) and exploring the practical details of incorporating environmental concern into the 
investment decision making process.   Environment for Development  Giamporcaro 
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Appendix 2:  List of Respondents  
  
 Asset Managers  Interview Date
Advantage AM October 2009 
Cadiz African Harvest   September 2009 
COMANCO/IDEAS Old 
Mutual Investment Group 
SA 
August 2009
Coronation AM November 2009
Element IM   September 2009
Future Growth AM Old 
Mutual Group
December 2009 
Investec IM  August 2009 








Metropolitan AM  September 2009 




RMB AM  September 2009 
SANLAM Investment 
Management 
 August 2009 
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Trinity Holding  September 2009
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